Learn & Share

name: Axios Supply Chain Node Spawning curl Download of Python Script to tmp Analyticcategory: 'Execution'threatname: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python'functionality: 'Endpoint Management Systems'description: |  Detects Node.js or npm processes spawning a shell that uses curl to download a Python  script to /tmp and execute it via nohup, consistent with the Linux payload delivery in  the axios supply chain compromise. The malicious setup.js dropper from plain-crypto-js@4.2.1  executes a single shell command: curl downloads the Python RAT (/tmp/ld.py) from the C2  (sfrclak[.]com:8000/6202033) and nohup executes it in the background. The Python RAT  uses only standard library modules, beacons every 60 seconds, supports arbitrary command  execution and binary injection to /tmp/.<hidden>, and reads system data from /proc/ and  /sys/class/dmi/id/. Notably, it does NOT establish persistence — a

name: Axios Supply Chain Anomalous IE8 User Agent with npm Registry POST Body Mimicry Analyticcategory: 'Command and Control'threatname: 'Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols'functionality: 'Web Proxy'description: |  Detects the C2 beacon pattern used across all three platform variants (macOS, Windows, Linux)  of the axios supply chain RAT. All variants share an identical and highly anomalous User-Agent  string mimicking Internet Explorer 8 on Windows XP (mozilla/4.0 compatible; msie 8.0;  windows nt 5.1; trident/4.0) — a combination effectively extinct in 2026. POST request bodies  are designed to blend with npm registry traffic by prefixing packages.npm.org/product0|1|2,  however npm.org is not the npm registry; it belongs to the National Pastoral Musicians  organization. The C2 endpoint sfrclak[.]com listens on port 8000 (non-standard) and routes  platform-specific payloads based on the product s

name: Axios Supply Chain Renamed PowerShell Executing from ProgramData Analyticcategory: 'Defense Evasion'threatname: 'Masquerading: Rename System Utilities'functionality: 'Endpoint Management Systems'description: |  Detects a Windows Terminal process name (wt.exe) executing from %PROGRAMDATA% with  PowerShell-style arguments, consistent with the axios supply chain RAT delivery chain.  The malicious VBScript dropper copies powershell.exe to C:\ProgramData\wt.exe before  executing the stage-2 RAT. wt.exe is the legitimate filename for Windows Terminal  (WindowsTerminal.exe), making this an intentional naming collision to bypass  process-name-based EDR heuristics. The renamed binary is invoked with -w hidden and  -ep bypass to suppress the window and circumvent execution policy. PowerShell executing  from ProgramData is anomalous under any circumstances; PowerShell masquerading as  Windows Terminal i

name: Axios Supply Chain - npm Lifecycle Hook Spawning VBScript Dropper Analyticcategory: 'Execution'threatname: 'Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic'functionality: 'Endpoint Management Systems'description: |  Detects npm or Node.js processes spawning cscript.exe or wscript.exe to execute a  VBScript file from a temporary directory, consistent with the malicious postinstall  lifecycle hook in plain-crypto-js@4.2.1 — the phantom dependency injected into the  backdoored axios@1.14.1 and axios@0.30.4 packages. The dropper (setup.js) writes a  hidden-window VBScript to %TEMP% that copies powershell.exe to %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe  and fetches the stage-2 PowerShell RAT from the C2 at sfrclak[.]com:8000. The VBScript  self-deletes after execution to reduce forensic artifacts. Any npm install process  that spawns a VBScript interpreter against a temp-resident .vbs file should be considered  highl

name: Masqueraded MSBuild Execution from Windows Startup Folder Analyticsignatureid: TELNYX2category: 'Persistence'threatname: 'Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Startup Folder'functionality: 'Endpoint Management Systems'description: |  Detects execution of msbuild.exe from the Windows Startup folder, which is a persistence mechanism  used by the TeamPCP Telnyx supply chain malware. The legitimate Microsoft Build Engine (msbuild.exe)  resides in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\ and is never present in user Startup directories. The TeamPCP  malware extracts a PE binary from WAV audio steganography (hangup.wav) and writes it to  %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\msbuild.exe to achieve persistence across  reboots. The dropped binary is a MinGW-compiled x86_64 PE that performs process hollowing into  dllhost.exe. This rule also detects the companion lock file (msbuild.exe.lock) which the malw

name: TeamPCP Archived Credential Exfiltration via HTTP POST Analyticsignatureid: PXY-TELNYX1category: 'Exfiltration'threatname: 'Exfiltration Over C2 Channel'functionality: 'Web Proxy'description: |Detects HTTP POST requests containing the X-Filename header value "tpcp.tar.gz", which is the consistent exfiltration signature used by TeamPCP across both the LiteLLM and Telnyx supply chain compromises. After harvesting credentials (SSH keys, cloud credentials, .env files, shell histories, cryptocurrency wallets, and Kubernetes tokens), the malware encrypts the collected data with AES-256-CBC, wraps the session key with RSA-4096, bundles both into a gzipped tarball named tpcp.tar.gz, and exfiltrates via HTTP POST with Content-Type: application/octet-stream and header X-Filename: tpcp.tar.gz. Independent validation on March 30, 2026 confirmed the exfiltration endpoint at 83.142.209.203:8080 remains active an

Campaign: TeamPCP — Telnyx PyPI Supply Chain CompromiseSamples: hangup.wav (Windows steganographic carrier), linux_payload.py (decoded _p credential harvester)What Happened...On March 27, 2026, the threat actor group TeamPCP published two trojanized versions (4.87.1 and 4.87.2) of the official Telnyx Python SDK to PyPI. This was the latest link in a credential-chaining supply chain campaign that began on March 19 with the compromise of Aqua Security's Trivy, subsequently spreading to Checkmarx GitHub Actions, LiteLLM, and now Telnyx. The campaign's defining innovation is the use of WAV audio steganography to deliver second-stage payloads, concealing executable binaries inside valid audio containers to evade network inspection and endpoint detection.This breakdown provides a deep technical analysis of both platform-specific attack paths in the Telnyx compromise. For Windows,

Here’s what happened...While browsing a legitimate Formula 1 news site, a programmatic ad creative hijacks your browser session and redirects to a sophisticated social engineering operation impersonating McAfee. The attack chain traversed multiple supply-side platforms (SSPs), a demand-side platform (DSP), and Cloudflare infrastructure before landing on a multi-step scam funnel that used fake virus scans, fabricated threat alerts, an alarm sound, a fake "AI assistant" chat, and an urgency countdown timer — all to drive the victim into purchasing a real McAfee antivirus subscription through a fraudulent affiliate link.This post documents the complete kill chain from initial ad impression to final monetization endpoint, including extracted IOCs, infrastructure analysis, and the social engineering techniques employed.The Initial RedirectThe attack began on racingnews365.com, a well-known F1 racing news site. While browsing on a mob

 On March 11, 2026, the Iran-linked hacktivist group Handala (a.k.a. Handala Hack Team / Void Manticore) executed a destructive wiper attack against Stryker Corporation, wiping devices and servers across the $25 billion medical technology company's global enterprise and idling approximately 56,000 employees in 61+ countries. This is the first confirmed major cyber disruption of a U.S. corporation since joint U.S.-Israeli military strikes on Iran commenced on February 28, 2026 (Operations "Epic Fury" and "Roaring Lion"). The attackers compromised administrator accounts and weaponized Microsoft Intune, Stryker's cloud-based mobile device management (MDM) platform, to issue remote wipe commands to all connected devices — a "living off the land" technique that turned Stryker's own IT management infrastructure against itself. The attack is assessed as retaliatory, timed 11 days after kinetic strikes began, and targeted Stryker specifically for i

Clawdbot, Moltbot, and OpenClaw are not three separate malware families — they are the same open-source AI personal assistant, renamed twice within four days. Created by Austrian developer Peter Steinberger and launched in November 2025, the project went viral in late January 2026, accumulating over 145,000 GitHub stars by early February and continuing to grow rapidly. The tool's architectural design — full OS-level shell access, plaintext credential storage, persistent memory, and an unvetted plugin ecosystem — created a significant threat surface that was exploited by multiple independent attack campaigns within days of going viral. Project Overview and Viral AdoptionOpenClaw is a self-hosted autonomous AI agent that runs locally with the same permissions as the logged-in user. According to Sentra's analysis, the project reached over 300,000 users within two months of its November 2025 launch. The agent executes shell commands, reads and writes files, cont